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financial markets.1 This Article focuses on regulatory compliance in the 
financial industry and the assumption that it is improved with the capabili-
ties of regulatory technology (RegTech), which is described as the use of 
technological solutions to facilitate compliance with and monitoring of 
regulatory requirements.2
As further described, currently, RegTech is one of the very few an-
swers to the risks and challenges existing in the financial industry, and has 
a crucial role in our technology-driven era. RegTech also certainly acceler-
ates the evolution towards a cooperative supervisory model, in which the 
supervisor guides financial institutions in their search for satisfactory com-
pliance and in which financial companies in turn deliver necessary input for 
the development of efficient guidelines, best practices and RegTech solu-
tions.
Nevertheless, this article argues that RegTech is not a panacea for all 
corporate governance challenges. First, certain barriers exist that make the 
adoption of RegTech more difficult. Second, RegTech alone cannot extir-
pate undesired and unethical business practices or resolve ethical issues 
resulting from corporate culture. Moreover, technology can be used by 
businesses to evade regulations and frustrate regulators, a phenomenon 
referred to as anti-RegTech. Third, technology can hinder good judgment 
and human input in the governance and risk management decision process-
es, which operate based on opaque programmed reasoning that is often 
biased and reflects altered interpretations of the law. Fourth, given the high 
stakes, financial institutions must be careful when partnering with third 
party firms, and should include regulators in the conversation before enter-
ing into such partnerships, especially given the increasing cyber risks. Last-
ly, many of the RegTech’s automation and efficiency gains have been 
offset by the expanded regulatory requirements and their costs, such as the 
increasing number of information requests from regulators.
The Article concludes by suggesting that there is probably a way for 
society as well as companies to greatly benefit from RegTech, but it re-
quires a carefully tailored design of the technology, a joint effort of the 
regulators and the private sector and some shifts in corporate thinking.
1. Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Risk Management and Compliance in Banking Integration
(N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 14-34, 2014), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2527222 [https://perma.cc/8R3C-VT6X].
2. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., CALL FOR INPUT: SUPPORTING THE DEVELOPMENT AND ADOPTION OF 
REGTECH 3 (2015), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/call-for-input/regtech-call-for-input.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FB99-5S6F]. 
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I. THE RISE OF FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY
The remarkable growth in data managing abilities and the consequen-
tial reduction in transaction costs facilitate the establishment of innovative 
technological products and services that many did not believe would be 
possible until recently.3 Particularly relevant to this article are the techno-
logical advancements of the twenty-first century that have impacted the 
financial sector, through the development of financial technology 
(FinTech).4 The transformation is primarily the result of the development 
of new Internet tools and digital technologies that have changed the lives of 
billions as financial services and products have become more physically as 
well as conceptually accessible, partly also because of their user friendly 
formats. For example, new technologies made it possible for payments to 
be processed quickly across the globe and for relatively low fees,5 or for 
individual investors to buy and sell online securities directly in the stock 
market without the advice of any intermediaries.6 These changes and the 
development of FinTech also made social media possible, which in turn 
enabled billions of people to be constantly connected and facilitated the 
consumption of unused assets via the sharing economy—a concept often 
powered by FinTech companies.7
3. See Annie Sneed, Moore’s Law Keeps Going, Defying Expectations, SCI. AM. (May 19, 
2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/moore-s-law-keeps-going-defying-expectations/ 
[https://perma.cc/DX4D-5THS] (discussing the accuracy of what Gordon Moore, the co-founder of chip 
maker Intel, who predicted over fifty years ago that computers’ processor power that will double every 
two years, and “still holds true a half century later,” despite “many technologists have forecast the 
demise of Moore’s [prediction of a] doubling”)
4. According to the Financial Stability Board in the UK, “The FSB understands FinTech as 
technologically enabled innovation in financial services that could result in new business models, 
applications, processes or products with an associated material effect on financial markets and institu-
tions and the provision of financial services. FinTech innovations are poised to affect many different 
areas of financial services in the coming years.” Monitoring of FinTech, FIN. STABILITY BD.,
http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/policy-development/additional-policy-areas/monitoring-of-fintech/ 
[https://perma.cc/C6SP-PF2J].
5. Lawrence J. Trautman, E-Commerce and Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons from 
PayPal, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 261, 278 (2017). 
6. Melanie L. Fein, Robo-Advisors: A Closer Look 1 (June 30, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2658701 [https://perma.cc/FKN6-STCZ].
7. See, e.g., Jim Marous, Fintech Use Reaching ‘Mass Adoption’ Among Digital Consumers,
FIN. BRAND (July 18, 2017), https://thefinancialbrand.com/66384/fintech-digital-banking-usage-trends/ 
[https://perma.cc/FJ7Y-WUCA]; Financial Technology Services Poised for Mainstream Global Adop-
tion, Led by China and India, FINTECH INNOVATION (July 20, 2017), 
https://www.enterpriseinnovation.net/article/financial-technology-services-poised-mainstream-global-
adoption-led-china-and-india [https://perma.cc/54RY-QXRT] (“40% of FinTech users regularly use on-
demand services (e.g., food delivery), while 44% of FinTech users regularly participate in the sharing 
economy (e.g., car sharing). In contrast, only 11% of non-FinTech adopters use either of these services 
on a regular basis.”); Alex Lielacher, How the Blockchain Can Create a True Peer-To-Peer Sharing 
Economy, NASDAQ (June 21, 2017, 8:24 AM), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/how-the-blockchain-
can-create-a-true-peertopeer-sharing-economy-cm806072 [https://perma.cc/9EGJ-K7Z5?type=image] 
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But at the same time the technological developments have provided 
extremely efficient tools for criminals,8 especially because a key character-
istic of many of these new technologies is their generation of, and reliance 
upon, massive volumes of personal data. Indeed, both digital technology 
companies and financial service institutions are exceptionally data-based 
and heavy.9
Generally classifying the FinTech industry, a subcategory of the digi-
tal technology sector,10 includes two types of companies. The first type is 
comprised of facilitators, which are companies that upkeep and maintain 
the technology infrastructure within financial institutions, or just aim to 
make financial services more efficient.11 The second type is comprised of 
disruptors, which are companies that defy existing structures and methods 
with new innovative processes of finance.12
A. Revolutionizing Consumer Financial Service Products
FinTech companies work on innovating digital banking and financial 
services, attempting to revolutionize consumer financial service products 
such as payments, capital markets, asset management, lending, insurance 
and maybe even the deposit activity, if legally possible.13 Among the new 
(“[B]y implementing blockchain technology into the sharing economy, there is no longer a need for a 
central authority to ensure that terms and conditions are upheld and that transactions are conducted 
accordingly. The distributed ledger technology can provide smart contracts, digital identities linked to a 
publicly-viewable user reputation systems and digital currency payments, all of which alleviate the need 
for a central authority.”).
8. See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. ILL. J.
L. TECH. & POL’Y 341 (2015); Lawrence J. Trautman & George P. Michaely, The SEC & The Internet: 
Regulating the Web of Deceit, 68 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 262 (2014); Lawrence J. Trautman et al., 
Corporate Information Governance Under Fire, 8 J. STRAT. & INT’L STUD. 105 (2013).
9. Karen McCullagh, Brexit: Potential Implications for Digital and ‘Fintech’ Industries, INT’L
DATA PRIVACY L., Feb. 2017, at 3, 4. 
10. Digital technology companies are defined as entities that offer a digital technical service, 
product, platform or hardware, or, alternatively, are greatly dependent on it, as their main revenue 
source. TECH CITY UK & NESTA, TECH NATION 2016: TRANSFORMING UK INDUSTRIES 9 (2016), 
http://www.nesta.org.uk/sites/default/files/tech_nation_2016_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2LM-
882H].
11. See McCullagh, supra note 9, at 4.
12. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future of Financial 
Services?, 69 CONSUM. FIN. L. Q. REP. 232, 232 (2016) (offering a discussion of disruptive changes 
taking place in financial services); ERNST & YOUNG, LANDSCAPING UK FINTECH 3 (2014), 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Landscaping_UK_Fintech/$FILE/EY-Landscaping-UK-
Fintech.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Q94-ZMLG].
13. See generally Pascal Bouvier, Banking Is Fintech, Like It or Not, AM. BANKER: BANKTHINK
(Oct. 29, 2015, 9:30 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/banking-is-fintech-like-it-or-not-
1077471-1.html [https://perma.cc/F7C2-HPCD]; PETER MANBECK & MARC FRANSON, CHAPMAN &
CUTLER LLP, THE REGULATION OF MARKETPLACE LENDING (2015); Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit 
Lev-Aretz, Big Data and Social Netbanks: Are You Ready to Replace Your Bank?, 53 HOUS. L. REV.
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players offering bank-like services, are businesses attempting to avoid ac-
ceptance of traditional deposits, and hence getting classified as a bank. 
These new forms of bank-like service providers have emerged over the 
years, gradually biting into the previously dominant market share of tradi-
tional banks. Referred to as “nonbanks,” such entities offer a variety of 
financial functions.14 Because the legal definition of a nonbank is neither 
unified nor clear, they are commonly viewed as the mirror image of 
banks—entities providing financial services that do not include the legal 
power to receive deposits.15 When nonbanks first entered the traditional 
1211 (2016) [hereinafter Packin & Lev-Aretz, Social Netbanks]; Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-
Aretz, On Social Credit and the Right To Be Unnetworked, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 339 (2016).
14. See Steve Antonakes & Peggy Twohig, The CFPB Launches Its Nonbank Supervision Pro-
gram, CONSUM. FIN. PROT. BUREAU: BLOG (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/the-
cfpb-launches-its-nonbank-supervision-program/ [https://perma.cc/4HWP-H74F] (“There are currently 
thousands of nonbank businesses that offer consumer financial products and services, and consumers 
interact with them all the time. . . . While banks, thrifts, and credit unions historically have been exam-
ined by various federal regulators, nonbanks generally have not.”).
15. There is no unified definition for “nonbanks” in the legal literature. Historically, nonbanks 
were considered to be institutions that voluntarily restrict their operations so that they either do not 
accept demand deposits or do not make commercial loans, thus avoiding inclusion under the Bank 
Holding Company Act’s (BHCA) definition of “bank.” Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Why Fed Has Failed to 
Cope with the Nonbank Bank Dilemma, AM. BANKER (June 29, 1984), 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-3327326.html [https://perma.cc/J62F-CBGT]. See generally 4A
STACY L. DAVIS ET AL., FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER’S EDITION § 8:1 (2013), Westlaw FEDPROC; 
Davis W. Turner, Nonbank Banks: Congressional Options, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1743–57 (1986) 
(chronicling the regulatory and judicial response to nonbank banks and the numerous interpretations of 
the BHCA’s definition of bank). That loophole has permitted nondepository institutions like Sears to 
engage in bank-like services. Luis G. Fortuno, Non-Bank Banks: Present Status and Prospects for the 
Future, 20 REV. JUR. U.I.P.R. 305, 314 (1986). While this definition of nonbanks is very vague, other 
definitions have also been offered. For example, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has 
recently stated that “[f]or [the CFPB’s] purposes, a nonbank is a company that offers consumer finan-
cial products or services, but does not have a bank, thrift, or credit union charter and does not take 
deposits.” Explainer: What Is a Nonbank, and What Makes One “Larger”?, CONSUM. FIN.
PROTECTION BUREAU: BLOG (June 23, 2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/explainer-what-is-
a-nonbank-and-what-makes-one-larger/ [https://perma.cc/T2CC-A8LN]. Differently, according to the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), any domestic or foreign company that is “predominately 
engaged in . . . financial activities,” with certain limited exceptions, is a nonbank financial company. 
See 12 U.S.C. § 5311(a)(4) (2012). The definition exempts a bank holding company, national securities 
exchange (or parent thereof), clearing agency (or parent thereof), swap (or security-based swap) execu-
tion facility, registered swap (or security-based swap) data repository, board of trade designated as a 
contract maker (or parent thereof), or a derivatives clearing organization (or parent thereof). Id. Accord-
ing to the definition, a company is “predominately engaged in financial activities” if 85% or more of the 
company’s consolidated revenues or assets are related to activities that are defined as financial in nature 
under Section 4(k) of the BHCA. Id. § 5311(a)(6). Additionally, the FSOC may issue recommendations 
for primary financial regulatory agencies to apply new or heightened standards to a financial activity or 
practice conducted by companies that are predominantly engaged in financial activities. See id. §
5322(a)(2)(K). The Federal Reserve decides what exactly constitutes “financial activity.” See Defini-
tions of “Predominantly Engaged in Financial Activities” and “Significant” Nonbank Financial Compa-
ny and Bank Holding Company, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,756 (Apr. 5, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 242 
(2015)); Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Board Approves 
Final Rule Establishing Requirements for Determining When a Company Is “Predominantly Engaged in 
Financial Activities” (Apr. 3, 2013), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20130403a.htm [https://perma.cc/3FQ6-7B4X].
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banking market, both banks and nonbanks were competing in a physical 
playfield—they conducted business at a physical venue, where existing and 
potential customers were able to come and interact with their service pro-
viders. Since then, nonbanks have started capitalizing on digital technology 
and the exposure to a broad audience provided by the Internet, significantly 
reducing operation costs by relocating from offline to online.16 The mobile 
revolution further facilitated access to nonbanks, and was widely received 
by Millennials, who are big fans of Fintech.17 The mobile revolution has 
also been a positive thing for underserved populations as it has allowed the 
unbanked and underbanked,18 who cannot or opt not to use banks for a 
variety of reasons, to enjoy the use of bank-like services.19 Specifically, the 
16. See, e.g., Gary S. Corner, The Changing Landscape of Community Banking, CENT. BANKER 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, Mo.), Fall 2010, at 1, 
http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/cb/articles/?id=1997 [https://perma.cc/QY7C-N8P3] (“Financial 
innovation over the last 30 years has changed the complexion of banking. Made possible by advances in 
technology, innovations such as . . . the development of a shadow banking system, have provided a 
greater array of nonbank alternatives to consumers . . . . However, for some community banks, the costs 
and risks to adapt to these changes were too high.”).
17. Millennials, who are members of the generation that was born from 1980 onward and brought 
up using digital technology and mass media, have been indicating a clear preference for using tech-
driven alternatives over traditional bank services. See SCRATCH, THE MILLENNIAL DISRUPTION INDEX
(2013), http://blog.viacom.com/2014/03/scratch-reveals-bankings-increasing-irrelevance-among-
millennials/ [http://perma.cc/A2WU-E4V9] (Importantly, 73% would reportedly be more excited to 
have their financial services provided by Google, Amazon, Apple, PayPal, or Square than by their own 
mainstream banks); Shane Ferro, 33% of Millennials Don’t Think They’ll Need a Bank Five Years from 
Now, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 20, 2015, 9:15 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/millennials-dont-think-
they-will-need-a-bank-2015-3 [http://perma.cc/6PFP-QTKB] (Footnotes that American Millennials 
increasingly regard banks as irrelevant and on the brink of disruption. Half of those surveyed believe 
start-ups will overhaul the way banks work and that innovation will come from outside the banking 
industry.). 
18. The unbanked are individuals with no official relationship with a bank, and the underbanked 
are individuals who maintain some form of formal connection with a traditional bank but chiefly rely on 
fringe financial institutions like payday lenders or payroll cards for their financial needs. See OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. POSTAL SERV., REPORT NO. RARC-WP-14-007, PROVIDING NON-BANK 
FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE UNDERSERVED (2014), 
https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-files/2015/rarc-wp-14-007_0.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/44K2-C236].
19. According to a 2012 report by the World Bank’s Global Financial Inclusion Database, three-
quarters of the world’s poor do not have a bank account for a variety of reasons, such as poverty, costs, 
travel distances, and other difficulties associated with opening an account. See Matthew B. Gross et al., 
Use of Financial Services by the Unbanked and Underbanked and the Potential for Mobile Financial 
Services Adoption, 98 FED. RES. BULL. 1 (2012), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2012/pdf/mobile_financial_services_201209.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SYG6-XYCS]; see also Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Leora Klapper, Measuring Financial 
Inclusion: The Global Findex Database 11–18 (World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Working Paper No. 
6025, 2012), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/453121468331738740/pdf/WPS6025.pdf [ 
https://perma.cc/3J93-KTP8]. In the United States, the situation is not quite as bad, yet approximately 
10.5% of the American population is still considered to be unbanked and approximately 17% is consid-
ered to be underbanked. MAXIMILIAN D. SCHMEISER ET AL., FED. RESERVE BD., CONSUMERS AND 
MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES 2014 5 (2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/consumers-
and-mobile-financial-services-report-201403.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y32E-C2YB].
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underserved community makes significant use of mobile phones and 
smartphones20: 69 percent of the unbanked have access to a mobile phone, 
49 percent of which are smartphones; and 88 percent of the underbanked 
use mobile phones, 64 percent of which are smartphones.21 Some of this 
mobile use is directly targeting financial activities: almost 40 percent of the 
underbanked with mobile phones reported using mobile banking in 2013.22
This means that mobile technology has not only revolutionized access to 
broadband connectivity,23 but it has also enabled access to financial ser-
vices for the underserved community by traditional banks and by new 
online nonbanks.24
In addition to digital banking, FinTech companies also operate in sev-
eral other areas. These include cryptocurrency,25 which has grown massive-
ly to comprise, as of August 3, 2017, more than 1,000 different 
20. SCHMEISER ET AL., supra note 19, at 5.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Simon Kemp, Social, Digital & Mobile Worldwide in 2014, WE ARE SOCIAL (Jan. 9, 
2014), http://wearesocial.net/blog/2014/01/social-digital-mobile-worldwide-2014/ 
[http://perma.cc/YZ73-55ZK] (“With reference to the continued growth in internet penetration, it seems 
clear that mobile connections will account for the vast majority of new sign-ups in the coming 
months. . . . [T]he distribution of mobile penetration matches much more closely to the distribution of 
the world’s population, meaning most people around the world now have a realistic opportunity to 
access the internet.”).
24. Many more technology advancements are still in development as major tech companies seek 
to expand Internet access to underserved populations. For example, Google is pursuing “Project Loon,”
a network of balloons traveling on the edge of space with the mission of providing Internet access to 
rural and remote areas. See PROJECT LOON, https://x.company/loon/ [http://perma.cc/V73N-3WU2]. 
Likewise, Facebook and several phone companies announced in August 2013 the launch of internet.org, 
a global partnership to make Internet access available to those around the world who lack broadband 
connectivity. See Technology Leaders Launch Partnership to Make Internet Access Available to All,
FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM (Aug. 21, 2013), http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2013/08/technology-leaders-
launch-partnership-to-make-internet-access-available-to-all/ [http://perma.cc/C6EX-QSKX]. Both 
companies have also acquired drone start-ups to promote their Internet delivery projects. See Josh
Constine, Facebook Will Deliver Internet Via Drones with “Connectivity Lab” Project Powered by 
Acqhires From Ascenta, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 27, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/03/27/facebook-
drones/ [http://perma.cc/3ZWT-U926]; Darrell Etherington, Google Acquires Titan Aerospace, the 
Drone Company Pursued by Facebook, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 14, 2014), 
http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/14/google-acquires-titan-aerospace-the-drone-company-pursued-by-
facebook/ [http://perma.cc/L5ZR-D8EM].
25. See, e.g., Carla L. Reyes, Nizan Geslevich Packin & Benjamin P. Edwards, Distributed
Governance, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 1, 5 (2017),
http://wmlawreview.org/sites/default/files/Reyes%2C%20Packin%2C%20Edwards%20-
%20Distributed%20Governance_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3B7-DNBC] (discussing the “significant 
hype that surrounds cryptocurrencies and the distributed ledger technology upon which they operate”);
Trautman, supra note 12 (discussing recent developments that provide a validation of blockchain 
application to financial services markets, as well as the regulatory challenges to the adoption of this 
technology); Mark Edwin Burge, Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: The ABCs of Future Public 
Payments Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1493, 1527 (2016); Jerry Brito et al., Bitcoin Financial Regulation: 
Securities, Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and Gambling, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 144, 150 
(2014).
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cybercurrencies, and a total market capitalization of approximately 
$100,714,988,183.26 Another field of operation for FinTech companies is 
crowdfunding,27 which is often referred to as alternative or distributed fi-
nancing, but is actually not really a new phenomenon, since nonprofits 
have long relied on donor promotions or drives that help raise and aggre-
gate small donations from multiple sources to fund their causes.28 The new 
elements, therefore, in crowdfunding are its global growth via the different 
online platforms and the large scale of financing it provides, which is 
demonstrated by the sales of fixed income instruments to investors driven 
by financial motives.29 Lastly, FinTech companies also focus their efforts 
in the area of artificial intelligence, namely, robo-advising. Robo-advisors 
have developed in the marketplace as an alternative for small investors who 
are content using Internet technology, but want to have the comfort of hav-
ing an investment adviser direct them. Robo-advisors offer investment 
assistance and flexible investment management services without the in-
volvement of a human adviser, building on algorithms and asset allocation 
models, which are promoted as being custom-made to each and every indi-
vidual’s investment requirements.30
26. CryptoCurrency Market Capitalizations, COINMARKETCAP (Aug. 3, 2017), 
http://coinmarketcap.com/ [http://perma.cc/65NX-56F6].
27. See, e.g., Andrew A. Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 661, 673 (2016) 
(discussing retail crowdfunding and its inclusive nature, being open to all).
28. A typically cited illustration of this concept is Joseph Pulitzer’s campaign to fund the pedestal 
of the Statue of Liberty in 1885, described in The Statue of Liberty and America’s Crowdfunding Pio-
neer, BBC NEWS MAG. (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-21932675 
[http://perma.cc/328B-4C3B].
29. See generally P. Raghavendra Rau, Law, Trust, and the Development of Crowdfunding (June 
20, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2989056 [https://perma.cc/AL9J-2XS6] 
(analyzing the economic determinants of crowdfunding after surveying over 1,300 crowdfunding 
platforms worldwide.)
30. See Fein, supra note 6. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Financial Indus-
try Regulatory Authority (FINRA) have warned that robo-advisors recommendations could rely on 
assumptions which are wrong or irrelevant as they apply to an individual’s financial standing and 
circumstances. Therefore, robo-advisors may recommend investments that can prove to be inappropri-
ate for individual investors. Investor Alert: Automated Investment Tools, SEC (May 8, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/autolistingtoolshtm.html [http://perma.cc/PU87-
6493]. Differently, however, the Department of Labor (DOL) found robo-advisors to be efficient in-
struments that can help minimize costs and conflicts of interest, and accordingly decided not to subject 
robo-advisors to heavy regulatory requirements that otherwise governs investment advisers. See, e.g.,
Mark Schoeff Jr., DOL Secretary Perez Touts [Robo-Advisor] as Paragon of Low-Cost, Fiduciary 
Advice, INVESTMENTNEWS (June 19, 2015, 1:24 PM), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20150619/FREE/150619892/dol-secretary-perez-touts-
wealthfront-as-paragon-of-low-cost [http://perma.cc/64PF-YCTF]. 
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B. Regulating the Rapidly Evolving Financial Industry
In general, plenty of ink has been spilled over the growth of shadow
banks and nonbanks in the last decade, the regulation that should cover 
them, and the appropriate regulatory authority.31 Moreover, while tradi-
tionally regulators focused mainly on banks as entities that could pose risk 
to the financial system, and especially the biggest banks, which are classi-
fied as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs),32 following the 
2008 financial crisis it has become widely accepted that nonbanks could 
also pose risks to the financial system,33 and might need to be better moni-
tored. But when discussing nonbanks and shadow banking, up until recent-
ly, the emphasis was not on Fintech.
Since the dot.com bubble, technology providers, scholars, regulators, 
financial institutions, and industry advisers, have started discussing the 
rapid developments in technology and their potential impact on society as a 
whole. Yet while the technology revolution has transformed the financial 
industry in significant ways, making it more efficient and inclusive,34 the 
financial industry—unlike the tourism, hotel, and even transportation in-
dustries, among others—has proven challenging to disrupt. The difficulty is 
mainly due to the fact that the industry’s already existing key players have 
an enormous advantage given their political capabilities, which directly 
influence their ability to circumnavigate rigorous financial laws and regula-
31. See, e.g., DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD–FRANK
ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 117–18 (2011); Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and 
the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 237–38, 267 (2012); William 
M. Isaac & Melanie L. Fein, Facing the Future Life Without Glass–Steagall, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 281, 
291–96 (1988) (discussing the rise of nonbanks and analyzing the “technological, economic, and com-
petitive forces [that shifted] financial markets away from traditional banking channels toward increased 
use of the securities markets for financial intermediation”); Morgan Ricks, Money and (Shadow) Bank-
ing: A Thought Experiment, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L.,731, 744–45 (2012); CATHERINE ENGLAND,
CATO INST., POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 85, NONBANK BANKS ARE NOT THE PROBLEM (1987), 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa085.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q2HM-X2X3] (analyzing 
the economic and technological changes that took place in the financial services industry).
32. Congress determined that any bank holding company with $50 billion or more in assets 
should be viewed as a SIFI, as would any foreign bank with U.S. banking operations that has worldwide 
assets of $50 billion or more. See 12 C.F.R. § 1310.23 (2015). 
33. “The growing influence of nonbank companies poses a risk to the financial system, and 
perhaps a national security threat . . . . [B]ankers should recognize the potential dangers posed by 
nonbank players, particularly in the payments industry.” Kristin Broughton, Apple Pay a Systemic Risk? 
Banker Warns About Nonbank Players, AM. BANKER (Nov. 21, 2014, 11:43 AM), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/news/bank-technology/apple-pay-a-systemic-risk-banker-warns-
about-nonbank-players-1071357-1.html [http://perma.cc/WP45-2RPZ].
34. A great example for this inclusion is FinTech’s ability to bring under the financial services’
umbrella individuals that were not covered before. As a result, financially underserved populations that 
historically could not, opted not to, or simply did not know how to use banks for a variety of reasons, 
started to enjoy the use of bank-like services. See Packin & Lev-Aretz, Social Netbanks, supra note 13.
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tions.35 Similarly, the more complex the regulation is, the more incumbents 
get a preference, as they have the capital to participate in sophisticated 
regulatory proceedings, or hire expensive lobbyists to favorably present 
them and make it harder for new competitors to successfully enter the mar-
ket.36 Trying to fight this bias that favors traditional financial institutions, 
in recent years technology companies have lobbied trying to promote more 
lenient regulation towards Fintech. In fall 2015, notable among these initia-
tives and efforts, is the technology industry leaders’ lobbying coalition—
Financial Innovation Now—that advances the companies’ interests, advo-
cates for greater innovation in financial services,37 and confirms their offi-
cial presence in the financial services market.38 Financial Innovation Now 
is defined as “an alliance of technology leaders working to modernize the 
way consumers and businesses manage money and conduct commerce.” 
The group’s goal is to “promote policies that enable these innovations.”39
By trading votes in favor of protectionism for pledges of support from poli-
ticians, representatives of the technology industry try to promote policies 
that work in their benefit.
In addition, policymakers all over the world, have struggled for quite 
some time with figuring out how to enable young businesses to enter and 
35. Greg Yang, Innovation and Disruption in the Financial Technology Industry, BOS. UNIV.
SCH. OF LAW (Feb. 27, 2017), http://www.bu.edu/law/2017/03/24/innovation-and-disruption-in-the-
financial-technology-industry/ [https://perma.cc/D3AS-VG53]; Alison K. Gary, Comment, Creating a 
Future Economic Crisis: Political Failure and the Loopholes of the Volcker Rule, 90 OR. L. REV. 1339, 
1366–67 (2012) (“Under the public choice theory, public policies with broad benefits and concentrated 
costs, like the Dodd-Frank Act, generally have well-organized opposition, as was the case with the Wall 
Street lobby. The resulting policy, then, tends to be only as strong as the minority bearing the costs is 
willing to pay . . . . Main Street demanded action, but the Wall Street Lobby made it nearly impossible 
for Congress to come to agreement on many details of the bill.” (footnotes omitted)).
36. Morris Panner, Strangling Innovation with Red Tape, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/18/AR2010111806073.html 
[https://perma.cc/NTB7-V2LL].
37. See Maggie McGrath, A Peek Inside Apple, Google and Amazon’s New Capitol Hill Lobbying 
Coalition, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2015, 5:50 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2015/11/09/a-peek-inside-apple-google-and-amazons-
new-capitol-hill-lobbying-coalition/#6758e5ad4eb4 [https://perma.cc/6JYH-X446]; Jim Marous, 
Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon Should Terrify Banking, FIN. BRAND (Aug. 6, 2014), 
http://thefinancialbrand.com/41484/google-apple-facebook-amazon -banking-payments-big-data 
[https://perma.cc/3UF5-Q4W3]
38. See, e.g., Christoffer O. Hernæs, What Facebook’s European Payment License Could Mean 
for Banks, TECHCRUNCH (Jan.12, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/12/what-facebooks-european-
payment-license-could-mean-for-banks/ [https://perma.cc/SU7J-DMLZ]; Robinson Meyer, Could a 
Bank Deny Your Loan Based on Your Facebook Friends?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/09/facebooks-new-patent-and-digital-
redlining/407287/ [https://perma.cc/RGE5-SMVV].
39. See FIN. INNOVATION NOW, https://financialinnovationnow.org/[https://perma.cc/2UT4-
G8TT].
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compete in the financial markets,40 while safeguarding consumers from 
new and innovative risky products and services, and preventing future fi-
nancial crises.41 Some even expressly admitted that they are promoting 
such an agenda because they believe that the current status quo, in which 
FinTech companies compete against banks without the oversight and re-
quirements facing banks, disadvantages banks, and that companies that 
provide banking products and services should be regulated and supervised 
like a bank.42 Among those attempting to foster the emerging FinTech in-
dustry are lawmakers in the U.S., where the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (OCC) proposed a special purpose FinTech charter.43
Likewise, in Spring 2017, the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion (CFTC) approved the creation of LabCFTC, a new initiative aimed at 
promoting responsible FinTech innovation to improve the quality, resilien-
40. See, e.g., Rachel Witkowski & Andrew Ackerman, Fintech Firms Get Chance to Apply for 
Banking License, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2017, 7:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fintech-firms-
get-chance-to-apply-for-banking-license-1489599873 [https://perma.cc/A7MH-7KF3] (U.S. regulators 
have been supportive of FinTech companies and their innovative businesses, as they started to approve 
unique licenses, which will enable FinTech businesses such as online lenders and payment processors to 
apply for a federal charter.). 
Finally, certain states have adopted regulation that relates to FinTech initiatives. See, e.g., Joanna Diane 
Caytas, Blockchain in the U.S. Regulatory Setting: Evidentiary Use in Vermont, Delaware, and Else-
where, COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. BLOG (May 30, 2017), http://stlr.org/2017/05/30/blockchain-in-
the-u-s-regulatory-setting-evidentiary-use-in-vermont-delaware-and-elsewhere/ 
[https://perma.cc/3PTA-STGY].
41. See, e.g., Yang Jie & Liyan Qi, People’s Bank Of China Has Fintech On Its Mind, WALL ST.
J (Aug. 7, 2017, 8:31 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/peoples-bank-of-china-has-fintech-on-its-
mind-1502109079 [https://perma.cc/X4LX-6CZU] (“China’s central bank is increasing its monitoring 
of the loosely regulated financial-technology sector—a major source of risk, given the enormous sums 
involved.”); Todd Baker, Marketplace Lenders Are a Systemic Risk, AM. BANKER: BANKTHINK (Aug. 
17, 2015 9:30 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/marketplace-lenders-are-a-systemic-
risk-1076047-1.html [http://perma.cc/SS9U-X3DM]; cf. Mike Cagney, How Marketplace Lenders Will 
Save Financial Services, AM. BANKER: BANKTHINK (Aug.19, 2015, 4:33 PM), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/how-marketplace-lenders-will-save-financial-services-
1076174-1.html [https://perma.cc/WBR8-ZREV].
42. See Keith A. Noreika, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
Remarks Before the Exchequer Club of Washington, D.C. (July 19, 2017), https://www.occ.gov/news-
issuances/speeches/2017/pub-speech-2017-82.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MXU-ALCL]. 
43. Discussing this charter, the Acting Comptroller Keith A. Noreika said that he thinks “it is a 
good idea that deserves the thorough analysis and the careful consideration we are giving it.” Id. at 5. 
The Acting Comptroller noted that the OCC’s “authority clearly includes granting charters to compa-
nies engaged in the business of banking,” and “[w]e should be careful to avoid defining banking too 
narrowly or in a stagnant way that prevents the system from evolving or taking proper and responsible 
advantage of advances in technology and commerce.” While acknowledging that, in general, “compa-
nies that offer banking products and services should be allowed to apply for national bank charters so 
that they can pursue their businesses on a national scale if they choose, and if they meet the criteria and 
standards for doing so,” he specified that the national charter “option exists alongside other choices that 
include becoming a state bank or operating as a state-licensed financial service provider, or pursuing 
some partnership or business combination with existing banks.” Id. Noreika even went as far as stating 
affirmatively that the OCC believes it has the authority to grant national bank charters to financial 
technology businesses that do not take deposits “in appropriate circumstances.” Id. at 9.
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cy, and competitiveness of the markets the CFTC oversees.44 The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) launched a FinTech Forum and 
working group, hoping to find ways the agency can improve clarity on 
regulation while encouraging innovation.45 And, other federal agencies, 
such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), have been at-
tempting to promote FinTech tools, via projects such as ‘Project Cata-
lyst.’46 Finally, the different states have also shown interest in regulating 
the new FinTech industry, and a battle might be under way between state 
and federal regulators who are competing to draft and enforce the rules that 
will guide the future development of the FinTech industry.47 And to make 
things even more complex, each state has a department or agency that is 
responsible for licensing and supervising state-chartered banks, and in 
many instances also sub-divisions that monitor and regulate lending institu-
tions, money transmitters and other nonbank financial companies.48
44. LabCFTC will also try to accelerate CFTC engagement with FinTech and RegTech compa-
nies that may enable the CFTC to carry out its mission responsibilities more effectively and efficiently. 
See Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Launches LabCFTC as Major 
FinTech Initiative (May 17, 2017), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7558-17 
[https://perma.cc/664K-LLDR] (“‘The purpose of LabCFTC is twofold: The first is to provide greater 
regulatory certainly [sic] that encourages market-enhancing FinTech innovation to improve the quality, 
resiliency, and competitiveness of our markets. The second is to identify and utilize emerging technolo-
gies that can enable the CFTC to carry out its mission more effectively and efficiently in the new digital 
world.’” (quoting CFTC Acting Chairman J. Christopher Giancarlo)).
45. Stating that “regulators have an obligation to understand, monitor, and — where appropriate 
— encourage such developments, while simultaneously being prepared to implement safeguards where 
necessary to protect investors and our markets,” the SEC admitted that it is focused on the following 
technologies: (i) automated investment products that are registered under the Advisers Act, their com-
pliance with that regulation, and robo-advisors’ potential to democratize investment; (ii) distributed 
ledger technology and its potential impact on trading, clearing, settlement operations and players; and 
(iii) marketplace lending platforms, crowdfunding portals and consumer protection-related issues.
Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the Fintech Forum (Nov. 14, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/white-opening-remarks-fintech-forum.html 
[https://perma.cc/GWR7-86XL].
46. See, e.g., Patrick McHenry, CFPB’s ‘Project Catalyst’ Failed. Fintech Deserves Better, AM.
BANKER: BANKTHINK (Apr. 25, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/cfpbs-
project-catalyst-failed-fintech-deserves-better [http://perma.cc/6NSV-VEV9].
47. See Jeffrey Alberts & Ingrid He, OCC vs. New York DFS: Battle for the Future of FinTech,
BLOOMBERG BNA (July 17, 2017), https://www.bna.com/occ-vs-new-n73014461841/ 
[https://perma.cc/W8GP-LCCD] (“For example, in June 2015, New York’s Department of Financial 
Services (DFS) promulgated rules for the licensing of virtual currency companies, which the DFS itself 
dubbed ‘Bit Licenses.’ Other state regulators, such as the Washington State Department of Financial 
Institutions, the Texas Department of Banking and the Connecticut Banking Department have institut-
ed, or been granted authority to promulgate, similar regulations.”).
48. The Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) is the nationwide organization of the state 
banking agencies. Its Vision 2020 initiatives aim to streamline licensing and harmonize supervision of 
nonbank financial firms. Press Release, Conference of State Bank Supervisors, CSBS Announces 
Vision 2020 for Fintech and Non-Bank Regulation (May 10, 2017), https://www.csbs.org/news/press-
releases/pr2017/Pages/051017.aspx [https://perma.cc/V9CV-4ZDQ].
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Similar to their American peers, the U.K. regulators have also shown 
interest in supporting FinTech tools. In particular, the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) is one of the most notable regulators to have adopted a 
regulatory sandbox approach, which allows businesses to test innovative 
products, services, business models and delivery mechanisms in a live en-
vironment.49 The sandbox provides a safe space for testing innovative 
products and services without being forced to comply with the applicable 
set of rules and regulations, and was adopted as part of Project Innovate, an 
initiative that started in 2014.50 Project Innovate’s goal has been to coordi-
nate the FCA’s approach to Fintech, and indeed the U.K. has been a true 
leader in facilitating and incorporating FinTech into the financial indus-
try.51 Other adopters of similar innovative approaches include, inter alia,
the Australian,52 Singaporean,53 and even Lithuanian54 regulators, which 
have been promoting similar efforts in their respective countries, with the 
49. See, e.g., Christopher Woolard, Dir. of Strategy & Competition, Fin. Conduct Auth., Address 
at the Innovate Finance Global Summit (Apr. 11, 2016), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/innovate-finance-global-summit [https://perma.cc/3D2B-
KGQ2]; Erik Vermeulen et al., Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens When Technology is Faster than 
the Law? 25 (Tilburg Law & Econ. Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 2016-024, 2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531 [https://perma.cc/3HQS-5PDQ] (explaining that “[i]n April 2016, 
the FCA broke new ground by announcing the introduction for a ‘regulatory sandbox’ which allows 
both startup and established companies to roll out and test new ideas, products and business models in 
the area of Fintech”).
50. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX 1 (2015), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7ZY-RFNN] 
(“This paper is a report . . . on the feasibility and practicalities of developing a regulatory sandbox that 
is a ‘safe space’ in which businesses can test innovative products, services, business models and deliv-
ery mechanisms without immediately incurring all the normal regulatory consequences of engaging in 
the activity in question. We believe there is opportunity to expand Project Innovate and introduce a 
regulatory sandbox.”).
51. Press Release, Fin. Conduct Auth., Financial Conduct Authority Provides Update on Regula-
tory Sandbox (June 15, 2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/financial-conduct-authority-
provides-update-regulatory-sandbox [https://perma.cc/F373-KHAQ].
52. As part of the Federal Budget 2017–18 released on May 9, 2017, the Australian Government 
announced plans to enhance the regulatory sandbox established by the Australian Securities and In-
vestment Commission (ASIC) in 2016. See COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, BACKING INNOVATION
AND FINTECH (2017), http://www.budget.gov.au/2017-
18/content/glossies/factsheets/download/FS_Innovation.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KQ2-BCKK] (“The 
Government is committed to establishing Australia as a leading global financial technology (FinTech) 
hub and is announcing a new package.”).
53. Enoch Yiu, Singapore Licenses First Chinese FinTech Firm, Heating Up Competition with 
Hong Kong, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 17, 2017, 7:30 PM), 
http://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/2102993/singapore-licenses-first-chinese-fintech-
firm-heating-competition [https://perma.cc/Z2VE-UFTX].
54. For FinTech Companies – Unique Opportunity to Join Financial Innovation-Friendly Lithu-
ania, BANK OF LITH. (Aug. 7, 2017), http://www.lb.lt/en/news/for-fintech-companies-unique-
opportunity-to-join-financial-innovation-friendly-lithuania [https://perma.cc/JRF5-GP43] (the Bank of 
Lithuania discussing its launch of a sponsored FinTech Sandbox.)
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hope of opening them to new businesses, sources of revenue and technolo-
gy advances.
Nevertheless, despite the appeal that FinTech has among regulators, 
some believe that using FinTech entails great risks,55 and certain commen-
tators have even gone as far as advocating for the biggest FinTech compa-
nies to be viewed as financial institutions, and possibly even SIFIs, for risk 
management purposes.56
II. REGULATORY TECHNOLOGY
In light of the fast and dramatic technological developments in recent
years, conversations about the application of technology to regulation, a 
concept commonly referred to as Regulation Technology (RegTech),57
have gotten much attention.58 There are several reasons for the interest in 
RegTech, especially in the context of financial regulation and the financial 
markets. First, the financial services industry has faced large amounts of 
new regulation since the 2008 banking crisis. Learning, interpreting and 
complying with voluminous legal requirements necessitates many re-
sources and enough manpower, and so the need to conduct the compliance 
work in an efficient, effective and cheaper way, has become apparent.59
55. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SEMIANNUAL RISK PERSPECTIVE
(2017), https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-
reports/semiannual-risk-perspective/semiannual-risk-perspective-spring-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6G27-M4P9]. One of the key takeaways is that “[s]trategic risk remains elevated as 
banks make decisions to expand into new products or services or consider new delivery channels.” Id.
at 4. Especially, as a “[h]eavy reliance on third-party service providers for critical activities and the 
increasing changes driven by new products offered by emerging fintech companies create increased risk 
relating to third-party risk management.” Id. at 5. 
56. Broughton, supra note 33.
57. See generally Janos Barberis & Douglas Arner, FinTech in China: From Shadow Banking to 
P2P Lending, in BANKING BEYOND BANKS AND MONEY 69 (Paolo Tasca et al. eds., 2016).
58. See, e.g., Nicole Bullock & Martin Arnold, Nasdaq to Buy London-Based Regtech Company 
Sybenetix, FIN. TIMES (July 25, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/6dad3956-7092-11e7-93ff-
99f383b09ff9 [https://perma.cc/VUY7-HUDN] (“The takeover of Sybenetix comes amid a wave of 
interest in using technology, such as cloud computing, artificial intelligence and biometrics, to help the 
financial services industry meet a tsunami of regulation unleashed since the 2008 banking crisis. In 
Europe, the incoming Mifid II rules for investment services are set to force banks and fund managers to 
collect much more data on trading for regulators than is currently required, creating an opportunity for 
companies such as Sybenetix.”); Ryan Browne, UK Regulator Looking to Use A.I., Machine-Learning 
to Enforce Financial Compliance, CNBC (July 13, 2017, 5:19 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/13/uk-regulator-looking-to-use-a-i-machine-learning-to-enforce-
financial-compliance.html [https://perma.cc/XY7Y-DH9Y]; Regtech Supplier Performance Report: 
Ignorance Is No Longer Bliss, It’s Now Criminal Offence, BANKING TECH. (Aug. 11, 2017), 
http://www.bankingtech.com/941652/regtech-supplier-performance-report-ignorance-is-no-longer-
bliss-its-now-criminal-offence/ [https://perma.cc/737C-CRTR].
59. See, e.g., BART VAN LIEBERGEN ET AL., INST. FOR INT’L FIN., REGTECH IN FINANCIAL 
SERVICES: TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS FOR COMPLIANCE AND REPORTING 2 (2016) (according to which 
RegTech is “the use of new technologies to solve regulatory and compliance requirements more effec-
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This need resulted in the invasion of entrepreneurs and innovators into the 
complicated and often hidden world of regulatory compliance with some of 
the same technologies that have disrupted the core operations of the finan-
cial services industry, such as machine learning, biometrics and the inter-
pretation of social media and other unstructured data. The hope is that these 
technologies, and others, will help improve compliance tools for regulatory 
obligations. Second, by automating and improving the compliance proce-
dures and tools the new technologies can reduce the investments and costs 
associated with the surging compliance and regulatory costs.60 Third, the 
increased use of technology within the financial services industry gives 
regulators the ability to access a level of granularity in risk assessments that 
has not existed before. Regulatory compliance is time consuming and ex-
pensive not just for the businesses that need to comply, but often times 
even more so for the regulators. The volume of information that parties 
must monitor and evaluate is massive.61
A. Regulatory Monitoring, Reporting and Compliance
Typically, financial regulation goals include, inter alia, the following 
fundamental mandates: (i) financial stability; (ii) prudential regulation; (iii) 
conduct and fairness; and (iv) competition and market development.62 In
addition, the issue of when to regulate can be as critical as what to regulate, 
tively and efficiently”); Gregory Roberts, Fintech Spawns Regtech to Automate Compliance with 
Regulations, BLOOMBERG PROF’L (June 28, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/fintech-spawns-regtech-automate-compliance-
regulations/ [https://perma.cc/29D9-Y5VT].
60. The costs are very high and continue to rise for financial institutions. According to Federal 
Financial Analytics, a policy analysis firm, the six largest US banks spent US$70.2 billion on compli-
ance in 2013, twice the US$34.7 billion spent in 2007. Kirsten Grind & Emily Glazer, Nuns with Guns: 
The Strange Day-to-Day Struggles Between Bankers and Regulators, WALL ST. J. (May 30, 2016, 
10:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nuns-with-guns-the-strange-day-to-day-struggles-between-
bankers-and-regulators-1464627601 [https://perma.cc/MYZ9-8ADX]. See generally FED. FIN.
ANALYTICS, THE REGULATORY PRICE-TAG: COST IMPLICATIONS OF POST-CRISIS REGULATORY 
REFORM (2014), 
http://www.fedfin.com/images/stories/client_reports/Cost%20Implications%20of%20Post-
Crisis%20Regulatory%20Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/RP7E-53B4]. In 2015, the Financial Times 
estimated that some of the world’s largest banks each spent an additional US$4 billion a year on com-
pliance since the financial crisis. Laura Noonan, Banks Face Pushback over Surging Compliance and 
Regulatory Costs, FIN. TIMES (May 28, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/e1323e18-0478-11e5-95ad-
00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/43YH-9FVY].
61. KEVIN PETRASIC ET AL., WHITE & CASE, REGTECH RISING: AUTOMATING REGULATION FOR 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1 (2016).
62. Douglas W. Arner et al., The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm? 32–33 
(Univ. of New S. Wales Law Research Series, Working Paper No. 62, 2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2676553 [https://perma.cc/3NQH-N4HJ]. The necessity for regulators to 
interact pro-actively with industry so as to perform and uphold their mandates, can be accomplished 
more easily through the development of “regulatory technology” or RegTech. Id. at 4.
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so that certain rules may not be enforced until specific thresholds are met, 
merely because early regulation can result in substantial wasted effort.63 A
great example of this is E-banking, which was introduced in 1980 in the 
U.S., yet has not become successful until being reintroduced in 1995 in the 
U.K., mainly because the U.S. regulators rushed to regulate the innovation 
too quickly.64 Thus, regulators, in addition to being tasked with translating 
financial regulation goals into specific requirements with which financial 
institutions must comply, need to also inquire when is the best time to regu-
late a specific issue, and monitor the compliance levels of all the players 
operating in the financial markets with existing laws, in order to ensure that 
the financial regulation goals are reached.
Regulatory monitoring of financial institutions, and particularly of 
banks, is conducted by government agencies and can be done through both 
on-site and off-site supervision. On-site examinations conclude in summary 
regulatory ratings, which constitute the main system of communicating 
regulatory opinion to banks. In some instances, regulatory examinations 
may result in informal actions including commitment letters, memoranda of 
understanding, and safety and soundness plans that are not publicly dis-
closed. In less common situations, the examinations may result in formal 
actions, which are acute in nature and publicly disclosed.65
On-site or off-site, resulting in actions that are informal and private, or 
publicly disclosed, regulatory monitoring has proven to be important. Stud-
ies have shown that if regulatory monitoring provides financial institutions’ 
boards new information and boards value such information, regulatory 
monitoring may improve managerial discipline.66 Regulatory monitoring 
influences managerial discipline by encouraging financial institutions’ 
boards to more seriously consider existing information.67 Additionally, 
research has shown that regulatory monitoring provides new information 
and therefore serves to complement the role of bank boards.68
63. Id. at 32.
64. Id. at 33.
65. See id.; Ajay A. Palvia, Banks And Managerial Discipline: Does Regulatory Monitoring Play 
A Role?, 51 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 56, 57 n.2. (2011). 
66. Id. at 57–58. 
67. Id.
68. Id. (“[A] growing body of evidence suggests that regulatory monitoring of banks, which 
operates largely through the bank examination process, does yield valuable information. Dahl et al. 
(1998) and Gunther and Moore (2003), for example, find evidence that regulatory actions lead to banks 
more fully reporting their loan losses. DeYoung et al. (2001b) find that bank regulatory examinations 
uncover valuable information and that such information is eventually incorporated into market prices. 
Further, Peek et al. (1998) show that regulatory ratings can improve forecasts for macroeconomic 
variables giving bank regulators an informational advantage. Finally, Wheelock and Wilson (2005) 
suggest that regulatory ratings contain important information and can be valuable in predicting bank 
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But despite the focus on regulatory monitoring, and the enhanced in-
formation technology tools in existence today, the financial institutions’ 
information environment does still influence regulatory monitoring. For 
example, despite the fact that in many ways nowadays information and 
communication technology can overcome geographical barriers,69 studies 
have shown that an increase in distance between financial institutions and 
their regulators reduces the quality of financial reporting.70 Similarly, re-
search shows that regulators make use of local informational advantages to 
enforce better quality financial reporting.71
Discussing the future of financial regulatory monitoring and infor-
mation technology, Andy Haldane, Chief Economist of the Bank of Eng-
land, shared his vision:
What more might be feasible? I have a dream. It is futuristic, but realis-
tic. It involves a Star Trek chair and a bank of monitors. It would involve 
tracking the global flow of funds in close to real time (from a Star Trek 
chair using a bank of monitors), in much the same way as happens with 
global weather systems and global internet traffic . . . . Its centre piece 
would be a global map of financial flows, charting spill-overs and corre-
lations.72
failure. [And t]o the extent regulatory monitoring introduces information or re-enforces the importance 
of existing information, such information can be valuable in disciplining bank management.”).
69. See, e.g., Sonam Tobgay & Kencho Wangmo, Can ICT (Internet) Overcome The Natural 
Geographical Barriers Of Bhutan In Developing The Nation?, 4 INT’L J. OF EDUC. & DEV. USING INFO.
& COMM. TECH. 148, 156 (2008); Cezar L. Mihalcescu & Ionel Iacob, Computer Banking System Under 
the Context of the New Information Technologies (Jan. 17, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1084797 [https://perma.cc/K9R9-QQ6A] (discussing certain financial ser-
vices, such as electronic trade that knows no geographical barriers, by their very nature); Sherubste 
Vinit Parida et al., Barriers to Information and Communication Technology Adoption in Small Firms 
Past Experiences 5 (Swedish Entrepreneurship Forum, Working Paper No. 2010:3, 2010), 
http://entreprenorskapsforum.se/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/WP_03.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6BW-
D5RV] (stating that “technological communication setups can eliminate geographical barriers”); 8
Ways Modern Technology Can Help Change the World, TECHDIGG (July 23, 2017), 
https://techdigg.com/2017/07/23/8-ways-modern-technology-can-help-change-the-world/ 
[https://perma.cc/H333-S9TL]; Akhil Saklecha, Technology Is Finally Eliminating Geography as a 
Barrier to Real Estate Investing, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 23, 2016), 
https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/23/technology-is-finally-eliminating-geography-as-a-barrier-to-real-
estate-investing/ [https://perma.cc/DZV7-VGT3].
70. See generally Ivan Lim et al., Does Distance Impede Regulatory Monitoring? Evidence from 
the Banking Industry (Oct. 12, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2807421 
[https://perma.cc/6NUG-3VCW].
71. Id.
72. Andrew G. Haldane, Chief Economist, Bank of Eng., Managing Global Finance as a System, 
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B. Enhancing Corporate Governance
RegTech promotes good corporate practice in compliance manage-
ment and enhances desired regulatory compliance outcomes. In particular, 
RegTech does this by enabling businesses to automate ordinary compliance 
tasks, reduce operational risks associated with compliance obligations and 
everyday tasks, such as auditing, enable compliance functions to make 
informed risk choices based on data provided insight, and create cost-
effectives solutions to problems. These solutions ensure that companies are 
up to date with the latest regulatory changes using technologies, minimize 
the likelihood of human errors, and increase the overall governance pro-
cess. Similarly, RegTech can also be a vital revenue source, especially in 
connection with lending or money transmission services.
Additionally, RegTech can prove valuable especially in identity man-
agement, risk management and security, including from a corporate gov-
ernance perspective, such as cyber whistleblowers, which are known to be 
helpful in changing corporate cultures,73 or Bug Bounty programs.74 And,
as mentioned, there are several new technologies, such as machine learn-
ing, artificial intelligence, and data storage cell level security—an applica-
tion of cryptography to information sharing, which enables only relevant 
and specific data to be made available to people, based on their access au-
thorization—that are promising in tackling compliance challenges.75
III. A PANACEA FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES?
A. Barriers to the Adoption and Development of RegTech
Despite its many advantages, there are five main barriers to the adop-
tion of RegTech that might make it less likely for it to be developed and be 
available or commonly used as a panacea for corporate governance chal-
73. See generally Nizan Geslevich Packin & Benjamin P. Edwards, Regulating Culture: Improv-
ing Corporate Governance with Anti-Arbitration Provisions for Whistleblowers, 58 WM. & MARY L.
REV. ONLINE 41 (2016), http://wmlawreview.org/sites/default/files/Packin%20%26%20Edwards-
Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9Q5-3RU3].
74. Amit Elazari Bar On, Bug Bounty Programs as a Corporate Governance “Best Practice”
Mechanism,
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. BLOG (Mar. 23, 2017), http://btlj.org/2017/03/bug-bounty-programs-as-a-
corporate-governance-best-practice-mechanism/ [https://perma.cc/NG5Q-FLA2].
75. See VAN LIEBERGEN ET AL., supra note 59, at 12 (“Cell-level security capabilities help organ-
izations overcome data security issues even for big data sets by applying access controls to every data 
object ingested into a common platform architecture. These labels are integrated with internal infor-
mation security policies, user attributes, and enterprise authentication and authorization systems. The 
language or framework used to construct the security labels is expressive enough to handle complex 
visibility requirements without adding an excessive burden on existing authorization systems, and 
allows users to encode Boolean or natural readable language expressions and attributes.”).
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lenges. First, the motive for market participants to assist with the formation 
of a common solution is, for different reasons, unclear. Most financial 
companies that must comply with regulatory obligations, go through a 
cost/benefit analyses to understand what is the most effective way to handle 
their compliance requirements. But the scope of such analysis is partial as it 
only covers a specific entity’s individual operational response rather than 
the entire industry.76 This limits financial companies’ aptitude to conceptu-
alize a common solution that would reduce costs for all regulated compa-
nies, and makes them focus on more than just short-term responses.77
Second, there is a missing mandate to speak about the common solutions or 
even have an established set of standards in the RegTech sector, since tech-
nology providers, financial companies and lawmakers are all reluctant to 
set up the dialogue around common approaches and solutions.78 Uncertain-
ty makes it harder for financial companies to choose a specific compliance 
solution. As a result, industry participants would benefit from a coordinated 
industry-wide design and collaboration effort to set clear standards for 
RegTech in the product development phase, with all lawmakers providing 
clear guidelines on the product requirements, as well as how compliance 
with specific regulations is required.79 Overcoming this barrier of uncer-
tainty regarding what good solutions look like might necessitate coming up 
with a neutral organization to enable the dialogue and manage the 
crowdsourcing of the knowledge essential for RegTech growth.80 Third, the 
complexity of the connection and interaction of the various regulatory initi-
atives make it difficult to adopt common industry solutions,81 and infor-
mation technology and data regulations, such as data protection or 
localization rules, can also be an obstacle to efficient information sharing 
across financial groups and result in ineffective parallel “silos” of infor-
mation in financial groups.82 Forth, some regulators still use outdated re-
76. See, e.g., id. at 5 (“[A]nti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing (AML/ATF) surveil-
lance would benefit from coordination and centralization, but is currently on a per-institution basis.”).
77. Mark Robinson, The Regtech Barriers: In Depth Analysis (Part 2 of 3), REGTECHFS (Mar. 7, 
2016), https://regtechfs.com/the-regtech-barriers-in-depth-analysis-part-2-of-3/ [https://perma.cc/2EEX-
GDAU].
78. See VAN LIEBERGEN ET AL., supra note 59, at 4 (“[A] lack of data harmonization or insuffi-
cient detail of definition makes it hard to aggregate risk data across financial groups and jurisdictions on 
an automated basis. Many financial institutions still lack an integrated data dictionary and taxono-
my . . . .”).
79. See id. at 5.
80. See Robinson, supra note 77.
81. Id.
82. See VAN LIEBERGEN ET AL., supra note 59, at 4 (“For example, while Basel 239 requires 
centralization of IT systems, recovery and resolution plans require different parts of the system to be 
self-functioning in the event of resolution, thus requiring a decentralized system. Tight regulatory 
deadlines for IT updates amplify this problem by requiring financial institutions to tinker around the 
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porting portals and errors, creating inefficiencies and increasing the likeli-
hood of introducing mistakes in reporting.83 Updating online reporting 
portals and secure data transfer mechanisms would drastically improve 
efficiency in the process.84 Lastly, uneven, overlapping regulatory time-
scales and regulatory demands make it harder for technology providers, 
companies and regulators to successfully team up in order to build an effi-
cient, automated compliance system.85
B. Corporate Culture and Anti-RegTech
It is naïve to assume that RegTech could, by itself, change financial 
institutions’ behavioral culture, ethical approach towards business making 
and attitude regarding the law and complying with it. RegTech is a tool that 
enables companies to automate ordinary compliance tasks, reduce opera-
tional risks associated with compliance obligations, permit compliance 
functions to make informed risk choices based on data provided insight, 
and create cost-effectives solutions to problems. But RegTech is typically 
created to do all of this in accordance with one basic assumption—to make 
sure a company does what it is supposed to do. Yet who decides what the 
company is supposed to do, the company or the government? One is dictat-
ed by culture, the tone at the top,86 and the other is dictated by massive 
amounts of constantly changing and not-uniformly enforced laws and regu-
lations imposed upon businesses by the administration and governmental 
agencies.87 Ethics is concerned with doing what is right, because as we 
edges of existing infrastructures rather than allowing for a more fundamental overhaul of systems. 
Regulations can also complicate applying innovation other aspects of compliance, such as through 
requiring in-person identification instead of allowing digital identity verification methods.”).
83. See id. at 5.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. SEC Chairman Christopher Cox spoke about best practices in establishing an ethical culture 
in U.S. companies. He said that: “Without a doubt, the best practice of all in any company is to set the 
right tone at the top. Over and over again, commissioners and staff at the SEC observe that the tone at 
the top is a major factor in determining the effectiveness of internal controls to prevent fraud, in treating 
customers, employees, investors and other stakeholder fairly, and in contributing to the long-term 
success of the organization. Leadership by example, good communication, and ongoing ethics educa-
tion and training are all vital.” Frank C. Bucaro, Q&A with Christopher Cox, SPEAKER MAG., Sept. 
2007, at 22, http://www.nsaspeaker-magazine.org/nsaspeaker/200709/?pg=1#pg1 
[https://perma.cc/A5EZ-W7UV].
87. See generally Eric C. Chaffee, Creating Compliance: Exploring a Maturing Industry, 48 U.
TOL. L. REV. 429 (2017) (also explaining that “business compliance is a field that focuses on prospec-
tively ensuring adherence to laws and regulations through the use of monitoring, policies, and other 
internal controls,” and stating several events in the history of the modern corporation that have spurred 
the current period of rapid growth in the compliance field, including the passage of general incorpora-
tion statutes by state legislatures across the country that transformed corporations from quasi-
governmental entities that were created and controlled by specific legislative acts into private business-
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have a strong moral conviction to do so, not because someone tells an indi-
vidual to, or because it will be “worth it” for that individual to do so.88 In
business, therefore, ethics is part of a company’s culture. Compliance is 
obeying the law, not because companies necessarily agree with it, but be-
cause they are required to do so, and that is very different from the concept 
of ethics.
Indeed, a business can have absolute and full compliance within its in-
stitution and still not be doing “the right thing.”89 A company can constant-
ly push the outer boundaries of the law hiring armies of advisers to help 
them do so while still be fully compliant,90 and that does not mean anything 
in terms of doing “the right thing” as far as its employees, society, the envi-
ronment or mankind is concerned.91 A business’ safety, privacy, environ-
mental, accounting, and intellectual property policies often cover only the 
bare minimum that the law requires, rather than raise the bar.92 A good 
es in need of additional regulation). See Todd Haugh, The Criminalization of Compliance, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1215, 1224–33 (2017) (discussing four eras of corporate compliance, culminating in its 
criminalized nature).
88. Character ethics is the branch of moral philosophy that deals with what defines one as a good 
person rather than conducting good deeds or keeping good states of affairs. E.g., ROSALIND 
HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS 1 (1999) (“‘Virtue ethics’ is a term of art, initially introduced to 
distinguish an approach in normative ethics which emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in con-
trast to an approach, which emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or one which emphasizes the con-
sequences of actions (utilitarianism).”).
89. This is because corporate compliance is becoming increasingly “criminalized,” which means 
that corporations are now approaching compliance primarily through a criminal law lens. 
90. Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2075, 2077 (2016) (explaining that companies can be hiring “hundreds, even thousands of compliance 
officers at a time”); Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate Counsel in an Era 
of Compliance, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 203, 217–18 (2016) (explaining how there is massive hiring of com-
pliance officers in regulated industries).
91. See, e.g., Michelle Chen, Here Are All the Reasons Walmart’s Business Is Not Sustainable,
NATION (June 5, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/here-are-all-reasons-walmarts-business-not-
sustainable/ [https://perma.cc/RV42-C7WR] (discussing Walmart’s “unethically sourced profits,” and 
stating that “corporate benevolence thrives as a manufactured solution to a crisis engineered by corpora-
tions. Ethics is reduced to a matter of noblesse oblige, not human rights.”); Waqas Shabbir, Would 
Consumers Stand by Market Ethics and Boycott Apple, a Proven Value Creator But a Blatant Tax 
Thief?, NATION (Pak.) (Oct. 1, 2016, 9:29 PM), http://nation.com.pk/blogs/01-Oct-2016/would-
consumers-stand-by-market-ethics-and-boycott-apple-a-proven-value-creator-by-a-blatant-tax 
[https://perma.cc/JFM4-C5R6] (“Apple . . . is hiding behind the rule that taxation takes place where 
value is created. It makes it exceedingly difficult for authorities to work out how much value is created 
in which country.”).
92. Businesses want to avoid government investigation and intervention into their matters—a
“painful, time-consuming, and colossally expensive” process with no sure endpoint. Jayne W. Barnard,
Corporate Therapeutics at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 793, 
817 n.119 (referring to compliance consultants used during investigation and remediation); Scott Kill-
ingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance Through Organizational Values and 
Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 961, 966 (2012) (“‘[C]ommand-and-control’ oriented [compliance] 
programs . . . [provide] [t]he explicit message [that] is the same as the message from law enforcement: 
follow the rules or pay the penalty.”).
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example for hoping to cover more than the bare minimum is the recent 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines amendments that dictate that not only must 
institutions have a means to prevent and detect violations of law, but they 
must also foster an ethical culture.93 Instituting policies in companies is 
great, and very much needed, but such policies are valueless if there is no 
culture to support them.
Monitoring a financial institution’s internal culture and behavior, and 
complying with customer protection processes, normally demands the 
analysis of qualitative information describing and reflecting the company’s 
culture and the behavior of individuals, such as e-mails and oral conversa-
tions. Creating RegTech that could automate the examination of these data 
sources would result in significant leaps in effectiveness, capability, and a 
faster pace in compliance. But being able to fully interpret these sources 
requires a very high level of technological capabilities, which might not be 
available yet. And, even if such technology is in existence, as with all tech-
nological innovations, RegTech can be used for both legitimate and illegit-
imate purposes. Thus, driven by the commercial incentive to manipulate 
that technology, or create other technologies to stick only to the bare mini-
mum, or even when legally permitted, evade regulation, businesses have 
started developing technologies that are intended to help them frustrate 
regulators’ goals—a phenomenon that can be referred to as “anti-
RegTech.” Such technology is clearly not meant to increase ethical behav-
ior at financial institutions, but merely pushes them and their compliance 
professionals to foster the very behaviors that the regulation created by 
lawmakers was intended to prevent. Moreover, while normally, there is no 
law against anti-RegTech, there are numerous ways in which anti-RegTech 
can breach local law and regulation, depending on the circumstances. “It is 
not enough to have one legitimate purpose, if the technology can (and is) 
being used for regulation-defeating purposes.”94
Finally, unrelatedly, even if the technology that would be used to ex-
amine and interpret the data is successfully developed, and used for legiti-
mate purposes only, technology alone cannot extirpate undesired and 
93. Importantly, the Guidelines state that, to have an effective compliance and ethics program, an 
organization shall “promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commit-
ment to compliance with the law.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2016). While the Guidelines are based on criminal law, the Federal Sentencing Commission 
states that “an effective compliance and ethics program not only will prevent and detect criminal con-
duct, but also should facilitate compliance with all applicable laws.” Id. app. C, amend. 673. 
94. Jack Nelson, The Rise of Anti-Regtech?, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 5, 2017), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=86320a8b-c385-4c29-b39c-c7dec328ce54 
[https://perma.cc/WN7Z-RMCM].
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unethical businesses practices, or resolve ethical issues resulting from cor-
porate culture.
C. Technology Judgment Rule
Technology can hinder good judgment and human inputs in risk man-
agement and governance related decision processes, which operate based 
on their opaque programmed reasoning that is often biased and reflects 
altered interpretations of the law. This is because the complexities of large 
financial entities and financial regulation are such that risk management, as 
it is currently conducted, has become a zone of automation. Similarly, 
transnational systemic risk management is also prone to include automated 
systems.95 But while regulators around the world had reluctantly accepted 
the financial industry’s over-reliance on convoluted mathematical models 
for risk management—especially in the context of appropriate bank capital 
levels—the discussions around financial regulation typically lack refer-
ences to the complexities of compliance that is conducted via various tech-
nologies.96
Writing about the design and nature of technologies, political scientist 
Langdon Winner’s controversial thesis, that technologies have politics 
embodying social relations, has inspired significant debate.97 Winner ar-
gued that technology both emerges from and creates social foundations. 
Under Winner’s thesis, technologies have politics in two ways. Either (i) 
“the invention, design, or arrangement of a specific technical device or 
system becomes a way of settling an issue in the affairs of a particular 
community”; or (ii) the systems are “inherently political technologies,” 
which “appear to require or to be strongly compatible with particular kinds 
of political relationships,” technical arrangements and social order. This is 
hardly surprising. As people adapt to technologies, their everyday practic-
es, feelings, and even identities may change, sometimes in unpredictable 
ways. Winner argues that “to recognize the political dimensions in the 
shapes of technology does not require that we look for conscious conspira-
cies or malicious intentions.” There are many cases in which “the techno-
logical deck has been stacked in advance in favor of certain social 
95. See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a 
Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669 (2009).
96. Id.
97. See LANGDON WINNER, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, in THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A
SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY 19–39 (1986).
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interests,”98 although the stacking does not always necessarily must be 
consciously designed by anyone.  One example Winner gives for such a 
situation is the failure to accommodate for disabled individuals that result-
ed more from a “long-standing neglect than from anyone’s active inten-
tion.” FinTech, and in particular RegTech, may offer new and 
contemporary dimensions to Winner’s paradigm. RegTech’s programs are 
likely to have an often-unintended yet somewhat biased design reflecting 
their programmers’ inherent biases and world-views.
Indeed, focusing on RegTech, Professor Kenneth Bamberger has ar-
gued that programmers who develop automated compliance systems de 
facto make decisions about how to best understand the law, and how to 
translate and convert it into code. Once this conversion is over, the law, as 
applied may be altered in significant ways from the law that lawmakers and 
regulators created — mainly because the regulators’ choice to focus on 
principles instead of rules is undermined by an implementation which 
transforms principles into rules. Not only is law adapted through the ac-
tions of managers of financial companies in applying it, but it is modified, 
probably in fashions that even financial institutions’ managements do not 
fully comprehend, by the programs that are used to apply the law.99 More-
over, Bamberger argues that unlike public processes for the development of 
laws and regulations, the processes that are put in place to produce compli-
ance systems are private and opaque.100 So while current technologies used 
for compliance purposes are known and highly considered for their preci-
sion, this accuracy is bundled with opaqueness and a certain interpretive 
cost that made these technologies be commonly referred to as “black-box” 
systems.101 Opaqueness, because the RegTech code is often kept undis-
98. The most commonly cited example from Winner’s work involves the segregationist politics 
embodied in the height of the bridges over parkways in Long Island, New York. But Winner gives other 
examples of consciously political design, such as (1) “Baron Haussmann’s broad Parisian thorough-
fares, engineered at Louis Napoleon’s direction to prevent any recurrence of street fighting of the kind 
that took place during the revolution of 1848,” (2) “concrete buildings and huge plazas constructed on 
university campuses in the United States during the late 1960s and early 1970s to defuse student 
demonstrations,” and (3) Cyrus McCormick’s introduction of pneumatic molding machines into his 
Chicago reaper manufacturing plant in the 1880s, in order to “weed out” the skilled workers who had 
organized a local union. Id. at 22–24.
99. Bamberger, supra note 95, at 696 (Bamberger explains the processes which leads to the 
creation of compliance systems as entailing interactions among different groups of professionals that 
communicate with each other in an imperfect way, leading to risk management systems that are eventu-
ally a source of risk.).
100. Bamberger asks: “[H]ow does the technological instantiation of law-elaboration through 
implementation fare in light of the public law norms of accountability, effectiveness and legitimacy that 
traditionally govern the exercise of delegated discretion?” Id. at 703.
101. See, e.g., Leo Breiman, Statistical Modeling: The Two Cultures, 16 STAT. SCI. 199, 199 
(2001). On the importance of transparency and accountability in various technologies and in particular 
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closed, and also fundamentally difficult to understand; it is extremely diffi-
cult to comprehend the type of data that is gathered, the associations that 
are targeted, and the concerns that are factored into the algorithmic predic-
tions. Those layers of opacity can disguise biased, discriminatory or other-
wise undesirable results from supervision until negative results become 
visible and clear. The secrecy protects businesses and public entities 
against open disapproval,102 and makes it harder to recognize the im-
portance of human judgment, and mandate it to be a part of the process in 
cases such judgment is needed.
D. Partnering with Third Parties and Cyber Risks
Given the high stakes, financial institutions must be careful when 
partnering with a third party RegTech firm, and get some input from regu-
lators about such partnerships before entering into such partnerships. This 
is especially true nowadays when cyber risks are constantly increasing,103
and businesses across different industries are so interconnected and inter-
dependent that hackers attack the advanced cybersecurity systems of bigger 
businesses by turning to smaller companies without vigorous protection.104
These smaller businesses are often contractors or third party vendors or 
directly responsible for critical infrastructure, or may hold data that could 
be valuable to hackers.105
E. Automation and Efficiency Gains vs. Expanded Regulatory Costs
While RegTech has serves as an efficient regulatory-related costs re-
ducing tool, many of the FinTech’s automation and efficiency gains have 
been offset by resources required to meet expanded regulatory require-
ments, such as the increasing number of information requests from regula-
algorithms of digital intermediaries, see Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? 
Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1159 (2008). 
102. Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, Learning Algorithms and Discrimination, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo 
eds.) (forthcoming 2018) (on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
103. See, e.g., Nizan Geslevich Packin, Too-Big-To-Fail 2.0: Cybersecurity & Digital Service 
Providers, 93 IND. LAW JOURNAL (forthcoming 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2988284 [https://perma.cc/EXD9-FY5Q].
104. Cybersecurity, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.sba.gov/managing-
business/cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/P25E-C6YN].
105. For example, the hack into OPM was the result of IT system access through a third party. See
Chris Laughlin, Note, Cybersecurity in Critical Infrastructure Sectors: A Proactive Approach to Ensure 
Inevitable Laws and Regulations Are Effective, 14 COLO. TECH. L.J. 345, 361 (2016). 
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tors. Therefore, it is not clear if overall, the automation and efficiency gains 
end up being higher than the expanded regulatory costs.106
CONCLUSION
Despite the many promising and positive aspects of RegTech, its 
growth is not a panacea for many of the existing corporate governance 
challenges. While RegTech helps efficiently reduce costs, creates addition-
al revenue to businesses that use it wisely, and even promotes good corpo-
rate practice and enhances desired regulatory outcomes, RegTech systems 
still pose some challenges. This article identifies considerable risks and 
challenges of RegTech solutions, which include high costs, certain barriers 
to the adoption and development of RegTech systems, RegTech’s unclear 
impact on risk management and corporate governance procedures of finan-
cial companies, the problematic side-effects of “dehumanization,” and the 
problematic issue of anti-RegTech.
As RegTech seems to be one of the very few answers to the compli-
ance challenge, it appears that the solution to both the risk management and 
the corporate governance RegTech challenges must include, inter alia,
increasing transparency, enhancing the technical expertise of lawmakers, 
and creating and a dynamic partnership between lawmakers and private 
sector entities, while acknowledging the importance of human judgment in 
RegTech operations. In addition, there is probably a way for companies to 
get out of the anti-RegTech catch-22, but it requires a fundamental shift in 
corporate thinking.107 Companies must be sincere in their intentions to 
build effective RegTech programs that, inter alia, take advantage of behav-
ioral human insights.
106. See, e.g., Lucy McNulty, Compliance Costs to More Than Double by 2022, FIN. NEWS (Apr. 
27, 2017 3:15 PM), https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/compliance-costs-to-more-than-double-by-
2022-survey-finds-20170427 [https://perma.cc/EM3U-A32E] (stating that “financial institutions’
regulatory costs could more than double over the next five years” and “finance professionals expect the 
costs of keeping the watchdogs at bay could creep up to 10% of firm revenues”).
107. Todd Haugh, “Cadillac Compliance” Breakdown, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 198, 203–04
(2017), https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/04/69-Stan.-L.-Rev.-198-
Haugh-.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7PV-TX7R].
